Abstract: The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a sadly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse Prinz's recent discussion of the 'Normativity Challenge' to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.
INTRODUCTION
The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics, at least in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety, centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity: its attempt to validate, by appealing to the nature of human beings, that certain traits of character amount to exemplary, excellent, or virtuous traits of character. But many defenders of virtue ethics have insisted that a naturalistic validation of the virtues might proceed in two quite different ways. One side of the distinction is sometimes cast in this Neurathian image: that when we extol certain traits of character as virtues of character, and when we give our reasons for doing so, we are like an acknowledgement of its fallibility. That approach contrasts with a more ambitious validation of the ethical virtues, one that proceeds from naturalistic materials that lie, already in dry dock, external to the ship. A traditional candidate here is Aristotle's alleged appeal to an 'absolute' conception of nature, replete with its metaphysical biology.
1 With this distinction in hand, virtue ethicists can claim that the long-standing criticism applies only to very ambitious 'external' appeals to nature.
A less ambitious validation of the ethical virtues-one that appeals, selfconsciously, to a conception of human nature that is, of course, open to dispute-can still seem well worth our philosophical attention. Indeed, the Neurathian image looks like an invocation of mere modesty: in this context it amounts to the familiar liberal idea that 'our' conception of the best way to live, something that is of course the product of culture, might be in various ways mistaken. Ethically sound practice involves, according to this modest outlook, not only the giving of reasons for our ethical conceptions, but also the taking of such reasons from those whose conceptions differ from our own. This idea of the 'giving and taking of reasons' is something that I mean in a completely mundane sense-it is the mundane sense employed by Martha Nussbaum when she appeals, without explication, to the 'give and take' of philosophical dialectic, in the quotation with which this paper begins. Such give and take implies neither-absurdly-accepting all of the reasons which one is offered no matter how irrational or outlandish, nor-stubbornly-merely claiming that one will consider the reasons which one has been offered. The claim that "I'll consider it" is often meant to indicate that genuine discussion has come to an end. 4 However, even this much is unclear: Mark Alfano has issued some worries about whether Prinz's appeal to such studies, on behalf of virtue ethicists, actually does answer the situationist challenge:
see Alfano 2013 , 51-52. 5 The quotations from Prinz in this section of my paper will accordingly be from that page of Prinz's paper: 2009, 133. 6 another route." More specifically, they argue "that morality derives from natural teleology." By appealing to such natural teleology, the proponents of an Aristotelian virtue ethics maintain that, "The normativity of the virtues derives from the fact that they are the end to which our nature directs us, and thus constitute human flourishing." A life of virtuous activity is also, of course, a life of affect: it is a life of both doing and feeling, a life that good people find enjoyable. Perhaps it is on the basis of such Aristotelian thoughts that Prinz says that flourishing is "widely presumed to involve certain affective states." He then claims (1) that flourishing is "related to" well-being and (2) that well-being is "an affective construct," a "subjective state." Prinz goes on to clarify that for Aristotelians the virtues are good "not simply because they make us feel good, but 7 because they make us feel good in a way that is indicative or constitutive of having fulfilled our natural ends as a species." The view that Prinz has in mind maintains that, (2009, 134) In this passage, the word "fulfillment" presumably refers to well-being, achieved according to a specific conception of it. Hence Prinz's thought can be put like this: subjective conceptions of well-being, resulting as they do from the influence of culture, are neither universal nor entirely natural. Thus the prospects for 'deriving' a universal list of the virtues from an account of well-being, construed in these terms, seem especially dim. An external validation of a set of universal virtues-a validation that takes a subjective conception of well-being to be the good that is unattainable without the virtues-is not, as The options constitute, he says, an unattractive dilemma. On the first horn of the dilemma, virtue ethicists might defend the idea that-in spite of the wide cultural variation in subjective conceptions of well-being-there is, nevertheless, a universal set of ethical virtues that promotes "all forms of well-being" (2009, 136) . This is what we might call the off-brand conception of virtue. Prinz rightly passes over this idea without comment.
On the second horn of the dilemma, virtue ethicists might maintain that some conceptions of well-being are, after all, better than others. But Prinz says that "such an argument would inevitably hinge on one of two mistakes" (2009, 136) . The first mistake is this: In assessing alternative conceptions of well-being "from within" (or better: from) our own evaluative outlook, we would "inevitably," Prinz says, "impose our own conception of well-being on others, when determining which is best" (2009, 136) . This would amount to an objectionable form of cultural chauvinism. (I will return to this point below in §4.)
The second mistake would be to go further external: to argue from an allegedly neutral, cultural-free standpoint, that some conceptions of well-being emerge as more natural, and therefore as 'better,' than others. Prinz's passionate rejection of any such appeal is worth quoting at length, since it encapsulates the 'long-standing' criticism of virtue ethics that I referenced at the outset. Prinz points out that this external strategy "assumes a conception of the human species that is profoundly false." He elaborates:
We are a cultural species, and it is part of our nature that our values should be forged in the context of human interactions. To the extent that those interactions engender different conceptions of well-being, as the empirical literature shows, we cannot pretend that there is some pre-social, purely natural conception. That is the myth of the noble savage. Indeed, if we could find such a pre-cultural conception, it would have scant normative force, for conceptions of well-being that did not emerge through cultural processes would hardly be applicable or conducive to thriving once we find ourselves situated in a cultural context. Faith in a universal form of well-being teeters between cultural chauvinism and a form of naturalism rivaling Spencer's in its naiveté and vulgarity. (2009, 136) The main thing to say, however, about the position targeted by this long-standing criticism is that many quite prominent defenders of a eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics have explicitly rejected it. 9 Certainly as an interpretation of Aristotle, the view has been fairly well repudiated. Julia Annas, for instance, writing more than twenty years prior to Prinz's paper, insists quite generally that:
The Greeks did not support their various claims about happiness and virtue by an appeal to teleology, nor to a fixed and determinate pattern of human nature which would impose on the recalcitrant agent a rigid and specific set of aims and mode of life. The appeal was rather to what we would call the best available moral psychology-something much more general, and disputable. 13 members of this community therefore tend to value cooperativeness in the sharing of such resources. Moreover, they insist that their own cooperative conception of well-being is better than the one embraced by the herders in the hills. The herders work in isolation and are, as a result, more prone to violence, for instance in defense of their flocks. Do the agrarians display a form of cultural chauvinism, insofar as they consider their own cooperative conception of well-being to be better than the violent alternative? Are they bound "inevitably" to impose their conception of well-being on others? There are many things to say in response to these questions, the answers to which, as we saw above, Prinz takes to be obviously affirmative. Here I will mention three points that suggest otherwise.
First, if the agrarians can prosper without interference from the herders, then the agrarians may not be, and perhaps should not be, especially concerned about the herders' tendencies toward violence. If a life that is overly prone to violence contributes to the different type of well-being enjoyed by the herders-given that the hills are so dangerous-then so much the better for the herders, and for their flocks. The agrarians need not be, and perhaps should not be, in any way involved. They need not even understand the way of life in the hills in order to adopt this attitude of toleration. 11 In any case, even if they did understand it, what reasons could the agrarians give (left as the herders are to fend for themselves) to embody the 'agrarian' virtues-e.g., the virtue of trust? The agrarians could of course insist that the virtue of trust contributes, as they themselves see it, to the well-being of agrarians. But they cannot plausibly insist that such a trait contributes to the well-being of herders: If the hills are especially dangerous, then 11 These claims are not meant to deny that there can of course be cases in which humanitarian intervention is justified.
14 such a claim is simply false. (Recall that we have already dismissed the implausible offbrand conception of virtue.) Hence the question of imposing a specific conception of wellbeing on others need not arise. Nor need the agrarian attitude of tolerance amount to a form of cultural chauvinism. The attitude that I have described can be maintained in full awareness that the herders look down in condescension on the agrarian way of life. This all remains perfectly consistent with the agrarians' insistence that their own conception of well-being is much better than the alternative conception, the one that incorporates habitual violence.
Of course the situation becomes rather different-this is the second point-if the herders descend from the hills. It may be that the herders threaten, not the agrarian way of life, but at least the lives of certain agrarians. In this case there may be no alternative to threatening sanctions against the herders: If the case becomes desperate, this will become the threat of violence, or, at the limit, simply violence. But in this case the imposition of a peaceful co-existence, by means of threatened external sanctions, looks like a justifiable imposition. (I will come back to "looks" in the next paragraph.) The situation becomes different again, of course, if the herders threaten, or even seem to threaten, the agrarian way of life. In that case the well-being of the agrarians becomes, or seems to become, compromised. The question that arises then-whether defending one's way of life justifies the threat of sanction, and even violence, in the face of a real or perceived threat from some new cultural element-is obviously a question that is too large to address adequately
here. But what I do want to insist upon should be predictable. In a society comprising members from both the agrarian and the herder communities-i.e., in a multicultural society-only a regrettably illiberal form of prejudice can seem to justify giving reasons 15 for one's own conception of well-being while refusing to take into consideration the reasons provided by others for their differing conceptions. Charles Taylor remarks in a similar context on what he takes to be a "general truth" about life in a society that is both multicultural and democratic; this general truth is that "contemporary democracies, as they progressively diversify, will have to undergo redefinitions of their historical identities, which may be far-reaching and painful" (Taylor 2011, 317) . What this observation highlights is that, although the agrarians may initially consider their own conception of well-being to be better than that of the herders-and although there may be nothing objectionable about that-the agrarians still cannot justifiably close their minds to the reasons offered by the herders for their different conception of well-being, violence-prone though it may be. Presumably there are reasons (which, for all we know, may be excellent reasons) for their traditional security concerns; and so presumably there are also reasons for their tendencies toward violence. Perhaps it will be the agrarians who come to realize-after taking (or accepting or embracing) such security reasons from the herder community-that their own agrarian conception of well-being is overly pacific or naïve, or anyway too prone to a blind and defenseless form of trust.
12
These considerations lead us to a third and final point about imposing our conception of well-being on others. While I said that the threat of sanctions against the herders looks, in some cases, like a justifiable imposition, it is a good question whether any behavior can in fact be ethically justified here, given the restrictions on the type of 'external' validation under discussion. This is an attempt, recall, to 'derive' a universal set 12 The point here is not to make an empirical prediction about the likelihood of convergence between initially differing conceptions of well-being, but rather to highlight its rational possibility.
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of virtues from a subjective conception of well-being "that makes no reference to virtue" (Prinz 2009, 134) . In that case, though, if the agrarian conception of well-being is 'substantive' in Prinz's sense, in the sense of being articulable without making any reference to virtue, then the threat of sanctions can only apparently be justifiable in this pragmatic sense: because such activity promotes agrarian well-being. In that case, though, any action that genuinely promotes the well-being of the agrarians will turn out to be, in that pragmatic sense, justifiable. The problem here is not, as Prinz says, that since the agrarians consider their own conception of well-being to be better than that of the herders, this means that they will 'inevitably' impose their conception of well-being on others. Nor is the problem here, as I argued above, that the attitude of superiority amounts to a form of cultural chauvinism. The problem is rather that without the giving and the taking of reasons-without the rational exchange of practical considerations between the agrarian and herder communities-an insulated and culture-bound conception of well-being provides a recipe for justifiable cultural imperialism. This consequence, though, is not a problem for eudaimonistic versions of virtue ethics, but rather for Prinz's understanding of them. virtues, by insisting upon the giving and taking of reasons, seems anyway to be required by 14 On the worry about circularity, consider a few especially prominent discussions that are not considered or acknowledged in Prinz's paper: Annas 1993 , Nussbaum 1995 , McDowell 1995 . In dismissing the 'internal' strategies deployed in these discussions, it does not seem to me to be sufficient to remark, without any detailed consideration of the discussions themselves, that it is "hard to do this without circularity" (Prinz 2009, 133) . Moreover, as I have understood the notion in this paper, the giving and the taking of reasons should mitigate worries from this direction: Even if one eventually arrives back at the same point from which one's rational reflection set off, there was no guarantee, in advance of such reflection, that this outcome would eventuate; and of course it may not eventuate. The image of circularity here is a bogeyman. (See also the subsequent note.)
any version of eudaimonism that hopes to steer clear of the long-standing criticism of virtue ethics.
15
In order to effect ethical progress, those engaged in ethical reflection need to acknowledge the two reciprocal practices that invoke ethical reasons here-not only the practice of giving reasons for our ethical conceptions, but also the practice of taking the reasons of others into account, even though these others may embrace ethical conceptions that differ radically from our own. Thus perhaps the Neurathian imagery, at least for eudaimonistic versions of virtue ethics, might emerge as less than fully appropriate, since according to the strategy defended in this paper, the vessel in question-a specific conception of eudaimonia-would remain helpfully porous. Or perhaps this dual practice, of giving and taking reasons, needs to invoke a slightly different image: one that involves a fusion of ethical horizons. Regarding this different, Gadamerian image, Charles Taylor has observed that the slogan here might be: "no understanding the other without a changed understanding of self" (2002, 295) . Hence the illiberal prejudice involved in my discussion 15 Nevertheless, Christopher Toner has recently issued the following objection in defense of a broadly MacIntyrean-Thomistic picture of universal human nature: that the sort of naturalism defended by McDowell (e.g., in McDowell 1995) "seems to give way to a lightly constrained moral relativism, in which morality is multiply, and variably, realized in a diverse assortment of cultures" (Toner 2008, 228 might also be thought of as an implicit and unjustified rejection of, or at least a resistance to, the idea encapsulated in this slogan, of a changed understanding of our own ethical outlook, and also (one might add) of a changed understanding of ourselves. 16 
